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appeal, review the evidence and to make its own findings of fact if 
it is convinced that the interests of justice so require it. 
Furthermore, the appellate court may disturb the trial judge's 
factual findings if it feels he has misapplied the law so that an 
injustice has resulted. Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 
1981). Also, the Court may disturb the Findings of Fact if it 
"reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Western Capital and Securities v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989, 
991 (Utah. App. 1989). See also. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 
(Utah, 1987). 
At no point in its Opinion does this Court reject the trial 
court's factual findings. In fact the Court's Opinion clearly 
demonstrates an exhaustive review of the evidence and the Findings 
of Fact. The only factual finding which this Court determines to 
be clearly erroneous was that involving the range of the 
appraisals. This Court, on page 3 of its Opinion, stated in 
footnote 3: 
Plaintiff questions the trial court's finding 
that the three appraisals to which Carol Klas 
referred ranged from $175,000.00 to 
$192,000.00. It is clear from the record that 
both Carol Klas and Mark Van Wagoner 
understood the range of those appraisals to 
begin at $170,000.00, not $175,000.00. Thus, 
we conclude that the trial court's finding 
that the three appraisals ranged from 
$175,000.00 and up was clearly erroneous. 
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah. App. 
1989). (emphasis added) 
The Court has stated that it had reviewed the record and has 
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a generally accepted and well established rule that 
unconscionability of a contract or a clause therein is a matter of 
law and not a question of fact. Utah Code Annotated, §70A-2-
302(1), 1953 as amended. See also, Annot. 18 A.L.R. 3d 1305. The 
finding that the difference in value was material to the Defendants 
was not changed or challenged by this Court. However, a ruling 
that the difference was not "unconscionable" as a matter of law was 
clearly a matter for this Court to decide on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT RETROACTIVELY APPLY A NEW STANDARD 
FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE AS IT PERTAINS TO THIS CASE. 
The Appellees in Point III of their Petition for Rehearing 
raise a novel argument and suggest that this Court should not 
retroactively apply a "new standard" for unilateral mistake. The 
trial of this cause was concluded on the 12th day of May, 1989 and 
the Memorandum Decision of the trial court rendered in favor of the 
Plaintiff on May 30, 1989. 
The case of Guardian State Bank v. Stanql, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah, 
1989) was decided by the Utah Supreme Court on July 13, 1989, 
approximately one and one-half months after the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision. According to the Defendants, the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision of May 30, 1989 should have applied the 
law existing on that date and any retroactive application of a "new 
standard" after that date would be improper. Nevertheless, the 
Defendants learned of the Stanql case, at which point they then 
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POINT II 1 
THE STANDARD APPLIED IN THE COURT'S OPINION IS 
THE SAME ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Defendants claim that thi s Court's Opinion ei ther 
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ignored the basis for this Court's thorough and well reasoned 
opinion. 
The four factors referred to in the case of Grahn v. Gregory, 
800 P.2d 320 (Ut. App. 1990) and applied in this Court's Opinion 
are not a new creation by this Court. They were clearly 
established and spelled out by the Utah Supreme Court in the 1987 
case of John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 
1209 (Utah 1987) which cited even earlier cases including Briggs v. 
Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985). The four elements of relief for 
unilateral mistake contained in this Court's Opinion are taken from 
these earlier Utah Supreme Court cases and are used as the basis 
for that Opinion. This Plaintiff cannot find and Defendants have 
not cited any authority which hold that this standard has been 
changed, overruled or modified in any way. 
In its decision in Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 78 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court did not establish a "new 
standard" for unilateral mistake. It simply discussed the 
evolution of the doctrine of unilateral mistake and serves to 
clarify the existing law. In Stangl the Court acknowledged that 
some of its prior decisions had led to a misunderstanding that 
relief was available only for mutual mistake. However, it 
clarified its position on this issue recognizing that relief may be 
granted on the basis of unilateral mistake. Id. at 5. At no point 
did it overrule its prior decisions in John Call Engineering or 
Briggs, supra or rule that the standard set forth in those cases 
1 
was erroneous. 
This Court specifically cited Stangl acknowledging it as a 
discussion of the doctrine of unilateral mistake. It did not 
attempt to set forth a new standard or supplant an existing one. 
It specifically relied upon the controlling standard handed down by 
our Supreme Court. 
POINT IV 
COURT MUST GIVE EFFECT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL 
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES 
In Stangl, supra at 6, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In its most simple and most straightforward 
sense, the law really only enforces the intent 
of the parties as to the fundamental agreement 
between them; 
In the present case, both Defendants were fully aware that 
Plaintiff would only accept an offer within the range of $170,000 
to $192,000 and on the condition that there be no contingencies, 
exceptions, or conditions. The Defendants agreed to those 
provisions and even prepared the Agreement to be used. There was 
no provision conditioning the Agreement on the production of 
written appraisals by the Plaintiff. The written Agreement speaks 
for itself and spells out the intent of the parties which should be 
given effect. 
In their Petition, the Defendants state that the knowledge of 
Mark Van Wagoner as an attorney, is somehow being imputed to 
Kathryn Van Wagoner. Such is not the case. Kathryn Van Wagoner, 
as a signatory to the contract, is simply being bound by its terms 
8 
and provisions and charged with the knowledge of its contents which 
are very clear and straightforward. Any argument that she should 
somehow be relieved of liability because she did not have the 
knowledge of an attorney is without any basis. 
In John Call Engineering, cited supra, at 1207-1208, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Generally, one party to an agreement does not 
have a duty to ensure that the other party has 
a complete and accurate understanding of all 
terms embodied in a written contract. Rather, 
each party has the burden to read and 
understand the terms of a contract before he 
or she affixes his or her signature to it. A 
party may not sign a contract and thereafter 
assert ignorance or failure to read the 
contract as a defense. This rule is based 
upon the panoply of contract law upholding the 
principle that a party is bound by the 
contract which he or she voluntarily and 
knowingly signs. (emphasis added) 
Kathryn Van Wagoner had ample opportunity to review the 
Agreement and discuss its contents with her husband before signing 
it. She certainly could have consulted with her husband and relied 
on his expert legal advice before affixing her signature to the 
Agreement. Nevertheless, she is charged with knowledge of its 
contents and should be bound thereby. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that the issues raised by 
the Defendant's Petition for Rehearing have been thoroughly 
briefed, argued and reviewed by this Court. This Court's Opinion 
clearly addresses the main issue on appeal and applies the 
9 
applicable standard of review in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions. 
The Court has not embarked on any fact finding beyond that 
which it is empowered to do. It has, in fact, adopted the trial 
court's finding of fact but ruled that the application of the law 
to these facts was incorrect. 
The law which was applied was not a new standard but rather 
the prevailing rule promulgated by our Supreme Court in several 
prior cases. Stanal is not a new standard for unilateral mistake 
and was not supplanted or ignored by this Court. 
Finally, the Court must give effect to the Agreement signed by 
both Defendants who should both he charged with knowledge of its 
contents. 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
Defendants' Petition for Rehearing be denied and that the 
provisions of this Court's Opinion and Order be enforced. 
<2f* DATED this w - f day of May, 1992 
-Pitt. ^&>. 
J^ kAtfT H. WALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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